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So who is to blame - the borrower, the broker or the lender? Clearly, it is partly the system itself. US subprime lenders were not required to perform stringent checks on borrower's credit ratings. The result is "ninjas" - loans sold to people with "no income, no job and no assets".
I think a lot of this comes out of the 90s when the feds hit on banks for not lending enough to minorities. The banking industry's answer was the subprime loan. Here we see the result.
Meanwhile, the once staid and socially directed system of providing home mortgages was seized by financial wise guys and turned into another casino. In the early 1980s, exploiting the Reaganite theme of government-bashing, the savings and loan industry persuaded Congress to substantially deregulate S&Ls -- which then speculated with government-insured money and lost many hundreds of billions, costing taxpayers upward of $350 billion in less than a decade.
In 1989 when Congress reregulated S&Ls, the financial engineers just did another end run. Mortgage companies that were exempt from federal regulation came to dominate the mortgage lending business. This loop of the story begins in 1968 with the privatization of Roosevelt's Federal National Mortgage Association. In the wake of that move, investment bankers invented a daisy chain known as "securitization" of mortgage credit. Through securitization, a mortgage broker could originate a loan, sell it to a mortgage banker, who would then sell it to an investment bank like Salomon Brothers, who in turn would package the mortgages into securities. These were then evaluated and coded (for a fee) by private bond-rating agencies according to their supposed risk, and sold off to hedge funds or pension funds. Each of these worthies took their little cut, raising the cost of credit to the borrower. Rather than diffusing risks (a course that economic theory urges on a prudent capitalist nation), however, securitization concentrated them, because everyone was making the same bet on real-estate inflation.
In the sub-prime sector, you could get a loan without a full credit check, or even without income verification. The initial "teaser" rate would be low, but after a few years the monthly payment would rise to unaffordable levels. Both borrower and lender were betting on rising real-estate prices to bail them out, by allowing an early refinancing. But when a soft housing market dashed those hopes, the whole sub-prime sector crashed, and the damage spilled over into other financial sectors.
This is such a huge issue here that city judges stopped allowing banks to foreclose against people. If they have any outstanding judgments against them for derelict properties they can't foreclose.
And they all have outstanding judgments for derelict properties.
Well, there's a brilliant idea! After all, everyone in a community suffers, and pays, indirectly, when high vancancies degrade the fabric of socitety to the point that crime takes over. And you in particular don't need any more of that. I cruised East Buffalo (out of morbid curiosity) and spotted houses tagged in spray paint, Katrina like, with indicators such as "gas shut off." Most appaulingly, one building bore the lable "house collapsing." Sure enough, the thing looked like it was a few swift kicks away from falling down.
My dad worked for Hooker Chemical (yes, of Love Canal fame), which was bought by Occidental Chemical -